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Abstract 
Much attention has been paid to the influence of the institutional form of waste collection on 
costs. We extend this literature in three directions by including the unit-based pricing system. 
First, we show that unit-based pricing systems are more important from a cost-minimizing 
point of view than the institutional mode of waste collection. In particular, the bag-based and 
frequency-based pricing systems are preferred. Second, dividing the cost effects between 
price and quantity effects, we illustrate that lower administrative costs and a smaller waste 
quantity are the most important drivers of cost decreases. It also shows that a disadvantage of 
the bag-based system is that it is not easy to price compostable waste. Third, if more general 
cost functions are analyzed, these estimations suggest that there are economies of scale for 
small municipalities. 
 
JEL classification: H31; H71; Q38. 
Keywords: waste collection; cost functions; efficiency; unit-based pricing; contracting out. 
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1. Introduction  
There is a large literature discussing the economic performance of waste services. Simões and 
Marques (2012) show that, in more than 100 papers, cost or performance functions are 
estimated in the context of discussing the efficiency of municipal waste services. Most of 
these studies look at the so-called public–private dichotomy in solid waste collection, as there 
was some evidence in the early literature that private delivery provides efficient services well 
adapted to needs and a reduction in the costs to the taxpayer. In an overview article, 
Domberger and Jensen (1997) show that private production suggests cost savings of the order 
of 20% without sacrificing the quality of service provided for a number of government 
services. However, the current evidence for cost savings from private delivery is more mixed. 
In a recent overview article, Bel et al. (2010a) conduct a meta-regression analysis, dominated 
by the refuse collection literature, and show that there is no unambiguous evidence for 
obtaining significant cost savings from private production.  
 
Therefore, the recent literature gives more attention to inter-municipal cooperation (for a 
recent overview, see Bel and Warner (2013)). In addition, based on Dutch data, Dijkgraaf and 
Gradus (2013) show that the cost advantage of inter-municipal cooperation is larger than that 
of privatization. Interestingly, there are large differences between omitting and including 
municipal fixed effects. For private companies, the cost advantage is substantially smaller and 
non-significant if municipal fixed effects are taken into account. So, the overall conclusions 
should be that it is important to include fixed effects at the municipal level. Moreover, one 
should be skeptical about the reported effects of privatization in studies without fixed effects.  
 
Almost separately, other instruments are implemented to achieve waste reduction and 
decrease the costs of waste collection. In order to promote waste prevention and recycling, an 
increasing number of municipalities in the United States, the European Union and Japan have 
introduced a unit-based pricing system (for a recent overview, see Usui and Takeuchi (2013)). 
This is also the case for the Netherlands. Starting from 15% in 1998, the percentage of Dutch 
municipalities using such a system was 37% in 2012. Dutch municipalities have introduced 
different types of unit-based pricing systems. Four such systems can be distinguished: 
volume-, frequency-, bag- and weight-based. Using Dutch municipal data, sizeable and 
significant effects on the amount of unsorted waste from the different unit-based pricing 
systems are found (see Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004, 2009 and 2014) and Allers and Hoeben 
(2010)). In Allers and Hoeben (2010) and Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2014), a fixed effect at the 
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municipal level is used and, as a consequence, the effects of unit-based pricing systems are 
somewhat lower but still remain large.  
 
Remarkably, the literature has given less emphasis to other elements such as the effects of 
unit-based pricing or recycling policies on costs. Simões and Marques (2012) notice that there 
is not much attention given to discussing the relationship between costs and recycling, 
disposal and incineration.1 Therefore, we include unit-based pricing systems in our cost 
functions. Indeed, unit-based pricing may reduce garbage quantities and increase recycling, 
but measuring waste quantities and billing households is costly. It will be shown that from a 
cost perspective, the introduction of unit-based pricing systems (especially frequency- and 
bag-based) is more important than the institutional mode of waste collection. Including the 
different unit-based pricing systems as explanatory variables in cost function estimation has 
an additional advantage. As administrative costs differ significantly between the systems, it is 
interesting to know which system is preferred from a cost-minimizing perspective. We also 
divide this cost effect between price and quantity effects. These quantity effects are important 
when comparing our results with the previous literature and it can be put forward that a 
weight-based pricing system is preferable from a quantity point of view but not from a price 
point of view. In addition, we distinguish the quantity effect between different waste streams.  
 
In this paper, we try to investigate scale effects as well. Stevens (1978) emphasizes the 
importance of differentiating between small, medium-sized and large municipalities. Also, 
early Dutch empirical evidence indicates that scale economies exist in this service for 
populations of fewer than 40,000 inhabitants (see also Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2003)). 
However, it is important to check whether most small Dutch municipalities still fall below this 
optimal size, as more flexible organizational forms (such as cooperation and municipality-
owned firms) are used in order to address the scale problem. By using different production 
technologies in a translog or a Fourier specification, we give some indication that Dutch 
municipalities already make use of this scale effect. Only for very small municipalities are 
there some scale effects.  
 
                                                     
1 An exemption is Callan and Thomas (2001). They estimate a cost function for disposal and recycling 
simultaneously. They found economies of scope between disposal and recycling. However, as we do not have 
separate cost data for disposal and recycling it is not possible to apply this approach.  
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The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, data and method are discussed. In section 3, 
estimation results are given. In section 4, the cost effects are divided between price and 
quantity effects. In section 5, different production technologies are estimated. Finally, section 
6 contains some conclusions.  
 
2. Method and data 
In this paper, we estimate the following cost function:2 
 
ln TCi = f (ln Qi, ln Ii, ln Si, ON, OC, OP, OO, OI, UBPs, ai, bt) + εi (1) 
 
where TCi are the (total) waste costs per household in municipality i. Comparison of total 
costs between municipalities is only possible when a correction is made for all relevant 
differences in exogenous factors. Most of the factors we use follow directly from the literature 
that estimates cost functions for waste collection (see, for example, Dijkgraaf and Gradus 
(2013)). Total costs will change:  
- if the number of stops made by the collection vehicle increases (Qi is the number of 
pick-up points in municipality i, measured as the number of households); 
- if the time spent at each pick-up stop increases (more bags or bins) (Ii is the number of 
inhabitants per pick-up point);  
- if the time to arrive at the different pick-up points increases (Si is the area served per 
pick-up point); 
- if the institutional form in which waste is collected changes (ON is a dummy with value 
1 for municipalities where waste is collected by a neighboring municipality, OC is a 
dummy with value 1 for municipalities that collect waste in cooperation with other 
(neighboring) municipalities, OP is a dummy with value 1 for municipalities that use a 
private collection firm, OO is a dummy with value 1 for municipalities that use a 
municipality-owned firm and OI is a dummy with value 1 for municipalities that collect 
waste themselves); 
- as the time-invariant municipal fixed effects (ai) change; therefore we include fixed 
effects at the municipal level;3 
- as the time fixed effects (bt) change; therefore we include a fixed effect for each year. 
                                                     
2 Price variables for the different inputs are not included as there is no ex ante reason for factor prices to differ 
between municipalities. Wage bargaining takes place at a national level. 
3 For convenience, we do not present the estimation of these dummies in the tables. They are available on 
request.  
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Importantly, we include whether municipalities have introduced unit-based pricing systems 
(UBPs are dummies with the value 1 for municipalities that use a unit-based pricing system of 
type s (volume, frequency, bags and weight)).  
 
We have data for 551 municipalities for the period 1998–2012, with a total of 6,694 
observations.4 Institutional and cost data on waste collection come from Agentschap NL. TC is 
calculated for each municipality by multiplying the average cost per household by the number 
of households.5 TC is in real terms as we correct for price developments on the basis of the 
index of consumer prices. Data for the socio-economic characteristics come from Statistics 
Netherlands (CBS). For descriptive statistics, see Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Mean Maximum Minimum 
Standard 
deviation Observations 
Cross-
sections 
Costs (total) 3,453,417 131,656,617 100,838 7,165,474 6,655 551 
Households 14,620 436,756 400 28,922 6,655 551 
Household size 2.48 3.70 1.68 0.21 6,655 551 
Population density 13,236 789,475 334 37,079 6,655 551 
UBP volume 7.08 100.00 0.00 25.65 6,655 551
UBP frequency 12.70 100.00 0.00 33.30 6,655 551 
UBP bag 4.07 100.00 0.00 19.77 6,655 551 
UBP weight 4.37 100.00 0.00 20.45 6,655 551 
UBP activism 14.38 100.00 0.00 35.09 6,655 551
US 15.38 23.00 0.00 2.66 3,034 508
Collection by neighbor 3.37 100.00 0.00 18.04 6,655 551 
Collection cooperation 15.45 100.00 0.00 36.14 6,655 551 
Collection MOF1 22.96 100.00 0.00 42.06 6,655 551 
Collection private 36.20 100.00 0.00 48.06 6,655 551
Waste total 13,663 307,096 530 20,907 4,942 530 
Waste unsorted 7,781 258,071 280 16,426 4,942 530 
Waste biodegradable 2,881 21,092 31 2,566 4,942 530 
Waste paper, glass and textiles 3,001 42,812 23 3,360 4,942 530 
Price (euro/kg/inhabitant) 0.23 0.55 0.09 0.05 4,942 530
1. MOF stands for municipality-owned firms 
 
                                                     
4 The number of municipalities decreased from 548 in 1998 to 431 in 2010. For 1998, data are available on 72% 
of the municipalities. From 2001, data on almost all municipalities (more than 95%) are available. For some 
small merged municipalities, data are only available in a couple of years.  
5 Agentschap NL presents figures on actual tariffs for collecting and disposing of garbage and on the extent to 
which these tariffs cover total costs. If actual tariffs do not cover total costs, we use coverage factors (provided 
by Agentschap NL) to calculate cost-covering tariffs. 
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Most of the empirical literature uses a Cobb–Douglas technology to describe the cost 
function. In equation (1), we have used a more general production technology f. It is well 
known that, after taking logarithms, a Cobb–Douglas technology facilitates the empirical 
estimation and its interpretation. However, it assumes constant scale effects (for derivation, 
see Stevens (1978), for example), which can be too restrictive. Therefore, in this paper, we 
evaluate more general production functions. The Cobb–Douglas function will be used in 
sections 3 and 4 and more general production technologies as translog, Fourier and flexible 
technologies will be investigated in section 5. 
 
Dutch municipalities have a legal obligation to provide a waste collection infrastructure for 
municipal waste, but they are free to choose whether to carry out this task themselves (own 
collection, municipal cooperation or neighboring municipality) or to contract out waste 
collection to outside firms (public or private). Of all observations, 36% represent contracting 
out waste collection to a private firm and 23% to a public firm (see Table 1). It should be 
noted that a public firm operates under commercial law, whereas the shares are publicly 
owned by municipalities. A third group of observations (15%) represents collection via a 
municipal service in cooperation with neighboring municipalities (see Bel et al. (2010)). For a 
fourth and rather small group (3%), the waste is collected by a neighboring municipality. In 
the Netherlands, municipal cooperation means maintaining public production. The remaining 
observations (22%) represent collection by municipalities themselves. Own collection is 
applied more in large cities and private collectors are used more in small municipalities (see 
also Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2013)).  
 
Interestingly, the market share of public firms increased substantially from 5% in 1998 to 
34% in 2012 (see Figure 1). The share of municipalities collecting waste themselves 
decreased from 31% in 1998 to 17% in 2012. In 1998, 43% of municipalities used private 
firms, while this figure was 32% in 2012. This fall was at least partly the result of the merging 
of small villages, as private collectors are especially active in these villages.  
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Figure 1. Market shares, measured by number of municipalities 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Number of municipalities with a unit-based pricing system 
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In this paper, we describe four different unit-based pricing (UBP) systems: volume, 
frequency, bag and weight.6 In some municipalities, ranging from 85% in 1998 to 63% in 
2012, a flat-rate system has been used. The volume-based program allows households to 
choose between different volumes of collection bin; 5% of Dutch municipalities in 1998 and 
9% in 2012 used this rather crude UBP system. A more refined marginal price results from a 
frequency-based system, in which the household pays for the number of times the bin is 
presented at the curbside. The share of municipalities using this system increased from 4% in 
1998 to 19% in 2012. In the bag-based system, households buy a special bag with specific 
marks. This is a more refined pricing system than the frequency-based one, as the volume of 
the bags is significantly less than that of the bins. Importantly, the bag system allows 
households to change volume each week. The share of municipalities with such a system is 
stable, at 4% in 1998 and 2012. Maximum price incentives result from a weight-based system, 
pricing the waste per kilogram. The collection vehicle weighs the bin before emptying and 
combines this information with the identity of the owner, stored in a chip integrated in the 
collection bin. From Figure 2, it is clear that the use of the more refined weight-based system 
increased at the beginning of this century and stabilized after 2005.  
 
3. Results  
Table 2 shows the estimation results for the cost function. All estimations are based on pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS). Seven models are used to test the importance of institutional 
mode and unit-based pricing system in different settings: 
- First, in the basic model, we include fixed effects for municipalities and we correct the 
standard deviation for clustered errors.7 This estimation will be used to divide between 
price and quantity effects in the next section.  
- In the second model, we only include fixed effects for years and we present the 
corrected t-statistics.  
- In the third model, we present the uncorrected t-statistics. As OLS estimates are still 
unbiased, only the standard errors will change.  
In the literature, there has been some discussion about the endogeneity of the UBP variables 
(see Allers and Hoeben (2010) and Usui and Takeuchi (2013)). Therefore, to test for 
endogeneity8 of a UBP policy, we add four models: 
                                                     
6 Some of the municipalities use a combination of these systems. We count these under the most refined system.  
7 In this case, it will be assumed that the standard errors for each municipality are not independently and 
identically distributed, that there is unknown correlation in εi,t between municipalities in group i within t, but that 
groups i and j do not have correlated errors (see Nichols and Schaffer (2007)).  
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- Fourth, we try to capture the possible endogeneity of the UBP variables by using their 
lagged values in our estimation (see also Usui and Takeuchi (2013)).  
- Fifth, we include a variable US9 representing the number of different waste streams 
collected by a municipality.  
- Sixth, as we have fewer observations for US (3,034 instead of 6,655), we use these to 
estimate an alternative model without US, so that it is possible to check what the 
separate consequence of including this variable is.  
- Seventh, we include an environmental activism dummy, which tests whether early 
movers are more environmentally orientated than municipalities that introduce unit-
based pricing in later years (see Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2009)). 
 
In all models, the estimate for the number of pick-up points (i.e. households) indicates 
constant returns to scale as the coefficient is very close to 1. In section 5, we will discuss the 
robustness of this assumption by using cost functions other than the Cobb–Douglas. In most 
models, household size has a positive and significant effect on total costs (except the model 
without fixed effects at municipal level). For area per household, we find a positive but 
insignificant relation (apart from the model without fixed effects at municipal level and the 
model including activism, for which the effect is negative and significant).  
 
According to Table 2, the choice of unit-based pricing system is more important in saving 
costs than the choice of institutional mode. Let us give the results for the basic model. The 
cost advantage of introducing a system based on the volume of the collection is smallest, at 
5.2%.10 The UBP system based on frequency reduces the total costs by 9.5%. Notice that, 
based on cost reduction, the bag-based system is preferred to the weight-based system. The 
cost reduction is much smaller (7.3%) for the weight-based system than for the bag-based 
system (12.4%), as administrative costs are much higher for the weight system. In the next 
section, we elaborate on this issue. Note that if no fixed effects are taken into account, the
                                                                                                                                                                      
8 Because of the unavailability of appropriate instrumental variables (IV), we employ OLS in our analysis while 
dealing with the possible endogeneity of the UBP variables by considering the bias caused by any omitted 
variable. Therefore, we include some different proxy variables. 
9 In the Netherlands in recent years, there has been an increase in facilities at refuse centers for collecting 
different waste streams such as construction and demolition waste and gravel (see also Dijkgraaf and Gradus 
(2014)). 
10  As the dependent variable is in logs, the effects of the pricing dummies are calculated using ex−1, where x is 
the estimated coefficient. 
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Table 2. Effect on waste collection costs: seven models 
(1) 
Basic 
(2) 
No munic.effects
(3) 
No clustered errors
(4) 
Lagged 
(5) 
Policy change
(6) 
Same data
(7) 
Activism
Households 1.004*** 0.996*** 1.004*** 1.020*** 1.025*** 1.025*** 0.995*** 
Household size  0.380*** –0.031 0.380*** 0.491*** 1.605*** 1.609*** –0.030 
Population density 0.006 –0.013*** 0.006 0.020 0.032 0.032 –0.014*** 
UBP volume –0.053*** –0.038*** –0.053*** –0.056** –0.033 –0.033 –0.054*** 
- activism      0.018** 
- 1-year lag   –0.005    
UBP frequency –0.100*** –0.118*** –0.100*** –0.084*** –0.065** –0.065** –0.139*** 
- activism      0.024*** 
- 1-year lag   –0.042**    
UBP bag –0.132** –0.231*** –0.132*** –0.165*** –0.071 –0.070 –0.209*** 
- activism      –0.022 
- 1-year lag   0.009    
UBP weight –0.076** –0.109*** –0.076*** –0.050 –0.091** –0.091** –0.138*** 
- activism      0.032** 
- 1-year lag   –0.058**    
US    0.001   
Collection by neighbor 0.003 0.044*** 0.003 0.005 0.014 0.014 0.041*** 
Collection cooperation –0.014 0.010* –0.014* –0.009 0.006 0.006 0.008 
Collection MOF 0.018 0.030*** 0.018** 0.021* 0.028* 0.028* 0.030*** 
Collection private –0.006 –0.029*** –0.006 –0.005 0.017 0.017 –0.031*** 
Constant 0.462 0.856*** 0.462*** 0.333 –0.754* –0.680* 0.841*** 
        
R2 0.974 0.977 0.974 0.973 0.953 0.953 0.977 
Observations 6,655 6,655 6,655 6,238 3,034 3,034 6,655 
Clustered errors Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects municipalities Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Fixed effects years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%. MOF stands for municipality-owned firms. 
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effects of the frequency, bag and weight systems are much larger. Therefore, including fixed 
effects gives a more realistic picture of the effects of unit-based pricing systems (see also 
Allers and Hoeben (2010)). In addition, it is better to use clustered errors as this will take into 
account the special structure of our panel data.  
 
Let us now discuss the cost advantages of the different institutional forms. The overall 
conclusion is that the effect of institutional mode is small and mostly not significant. If no 
fixed effects are taken into account, privatization has a significant downwards cost effect of 
3%. This is in line with Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2013), who show that positive privatization 
effects disappear if municipal fixed effects are taken into account. Interestingly, when we 
include these effects (column 3), there is a significant cost advantage of 1.4% from inter-
municipal cooperation, although it is very small. However, the significance disappears if 
clustered errors are taken into account. The difference between the basic model and the model 
without clustered errors is small as the only other coefficient that will no longer be significant 
(at the 95% level) is for collection by municipality-owned firms. 
 
Results are quite similar among models 4, 5, 6 and 7, where we test endogeneity. We do find 
some evidence of an announcement effect from a UBP policy on waste reduction (model 4). 
The estimation results for model 5, where we include the variable US, are quite similar to 
those of model 6, i.e. the basic model corrected for fewer observations due to including US. 
While we find some evidence of an announcement effect for the frequency-based system and 
the weight-based system, there is no such effect in the volume-based and bag-based systems. 
The announcement effect is driven by an environmental activism effect. Dutch municipalities 
that introduced frequency- or weight-based pricing early are more environmentally orientated 
than municipalities that introduced such pricing in later years (see also Linderhof et al. (2001) 
and Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2014)). This is confirmed by model 7, where we introduce an 
environmental activism dummy.11 This tests whether municipalities that have already 
introduced UBP had higher waste costs before introduction, because they were more 
environmentally friendly. Table 2 shows that there is an environmental activism effect for 
volume-, frequency- and weight-based pricing systems. However, this effect is relatively 
small compared with the overall effect of the relevant UBP system. The only problem with 
model 7 is that we have to exclude fixed effects as it is impossible to combine fixed effects 
                                                     
11 The environmental activism dummy has the value 1 in all years for each municipality that introduces a specific 
unit-based pricing system (see also Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2009)). 
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and the environmental activism dummy.12 Hereafter, we confine our discussion to the basic 
model (model 1). 
 
In conclusion: as we have a large panel data set, it is important to correct for municipal fixed 
effects and clustered errors. When we do this, it is clear that the effects of unit-based pricing 
are much more important than the effects of institutional mode. Ranking the unit-based 
pricing systems according to their cost advantage gives (1) bag, (2) frequency, (3) weight and 
(4) volume.  
 
4. A division between price and quantity effects  
In this section, we divide the cost effect between price and quantity effects (see Table 3).13 To 
our knowledge, we are the first to describe these effects simultaneously. In the literature, 
much attention has been paid to quantity effects (see, for example, Kinnaman (2006) for an 
overview). Notice that as a consequence of this approach fewer observations are available 
(4,942 instead of 6,655). For example, data for 2012 are excluded for the costs estimation as 
no data are available for 2012 for waste quantity. Especially, the costs estimation of the bag-
based pricing system in Table 3 is different from Table 2. An explanation for this is that the 
number of observations for the bag-based pricing system (see also Figure 2).     
 
From the literature, it is well known that unit-based pricing using the weight, bag or frequency 
system generates sizeable reductions in unsorted waste and other waste streams and an 
increase in recycling (see Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2014)). This is important for cost reduction, 
as the costs of incineration are approximately 60% of waste costs in the Netherlands. As a 
consequence, the institutional mode can only save collection costs, which are limited as they 
are on average 40% of total costs.  
 
From Table 3, it can be seen that the weight system has the largest effect on quantities, 
reducing them by 29%, followed by the frequency system (17%), the bag system (8%). The 
effect of introducing a system based only on the volume of the collection is small (2%). This 
result is not surprising since the volume-based system is less refined than the other systems.  
                                                     
12 The fixed effects will capture parts of the environmental activism effect. 
13 Price is defined as total costs divided by total quantity. We will estimate lnQ and lnP with the same exogenous 
variables as equation (1).  
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Table 3. A division between price and quantity effects 
Costs Quantity Price 
Households 1.024*** 0.968*** 0.056 
Household size  0.298* 1.039*** -0.742*** 
Population density 0.008 0.002 0.006
UBP volume -0.053*** -0.018** -0.035 
UBP frequency -0.080*** -0.180*** 0.100*** 
UBP bag -0.073* -0.080*** 0.008 
UBP weight -0.077** -0.346*** 0.269***
Collection by neighbor 0.012 0.009 0.004
Collection cooperation -0.010 0.013 -0.023 
Collection MOF 0.014 0.009 0.005 
Collection private -0.008 0.013 -0.021 
Constant 0.377 6.319*** –1.346***
    
R2 0.973 0.978 0.347 
Observations 4,942 4,942 4,942 
Clustered errors Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects municipalities Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects years Yes Yes Yes 
Note: ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%. MOF stands for 
municipality-owned firms.  
 
Interestingly, the quantity effect is larger for the frequency-based system than for the bag-
based system. Two disadvantages of the bag system are that Dutch legislation limits the 
number of bags carried per waste collection employee and that there is an incentive for 
households to put as much waste as possible in each bag, which makes them difficult to 
handle (see also Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996)). The same issues also make it hard to have a 
bag for compostable waste and therefore, in contrast to the other systems, the bag-based 
system is generally used for unsorted waste only.14 This point can be illustrated by Table 4, 
where we divide the quantity effect into its important waste streams (unsorted, compostable 
and recyclable waste represented by paper, glass and textiles). The weight- and bag-based 
pricing systems reduce the amount of unsorted waste by more than the frequency- and 
volume-based pricing systems. However, only the weight- and frequency-based systems have 
a significant negative effect in reducing the amount of compostable waste. For the bag-based 
pricing system a significant increase of compostable waste takes place. This is a further 
indication that bag-based pricing systems will not be used for compostable waste. The UBP 
systems all increase the amount of recyclable waste collected. Thus, the overall conclusion is 
                                                     
14 Allers and Hoeben (2010) illustrate that, in the Netherlands, the bag-based system is generally used for 
unsorted waste only. 
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that the weight and frequency systems generate sizeable reductions in both unsorted and 
compostable waste.  
 
Table 4. A division of the quantity effect into unsorted, compostable and recyclable 
waste 
Unsorted Compostable Paper, glass and textiles 
Households 0.954*** 1.009*** 0.972*** 
Household size  1.027*** 1.117*** 1.065*** 
Population density 0.008 0.020 -0.007 
UBP volume -0.063*** 0.034 0.036* 
UBP frequency -0.215*** -0.389*** 0.081*** 
UBP bag -0.416*** 0.152*** 0.112*** 
UBP weight -0.447*** -0.785*** 0.087*** 
Collection by neighbor 0.016 -0.003 0.022 
Collection cooperation 0.016 0.033 0.004 
Collection MOF 0.001 0.053** 0.001 
Collection private 0.011 0.051** 0.004 
Constant 5.779*** 4.598*** 4.687*** 
    
R2 0.953 0.706 0.946 
Observations 4,942 4,942 4,942 
Clustered errors Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects municipalities Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects years Yes Yes Yes 
Note: ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%. MOF stands for municipality-owned 
firms.  
 
The price effects of the unit-based pricing dummies give some insights as well. The (average) 
price per kilogram of the volume-based system is somewhat lower than the price for the flat-
rate system and for bag-based pricing system is somewhat higher. For the frequency- and 
weight-based pricing systems, it is (substantially) higher with the largest price effect for the 
weight-based system. This is in accordance with the administrative costs of the different 
systems. In VROM (1997), there is an evaluation of the administrative costs of the weight-, 
bag- and frequency-based pricing systems in 12 Dutch municipalities. According to that 
study, yearly average administrative costs in 2012 prices are higher for the weight-based 
pricing system (20 euro per household) than for the other systems (9 euro for the bag-based 
system, 12 euro for the frequency-based system).  
 
The division between price and quantity effects can also explain why the share of 
municipalities with bag- and weight-based pricing systems is quite stable and why the share 
of municipalities with a frequency-based system is increasing. A disadvantage of the weight-
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based system is the high administrative cost and a disadvantage of the bag-based system is 
that it is not easy to price compostable waste; the frequency-based system does not have such 
disadvantages.  
 
5. Alternative cost functions  
The overview paper by Simões and Marques (2012, p. 43) shows that 93% of the papers use a 
Cobb–Douglas technology and that other techniques are scarcely used. In sections 3 and 4, we 
assumed a Cobb–Douglas production technology. However, empirical findings in other 
sectors show that this specification might be too restrictive as it assumes constant scale effects 
(see also Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2008 ). To test this, we specify three alternative cost 
functions: 
- a translog form;  
- a flexible functional form (to the power 3);  
- a Fourier flexible form.  
Each alternative cost function has its advantages (and disadvantages). A translog function 
leads to a typical U-shape of the cost function. However, there could be more turning points 
and therefore we also estimate more flexible functional forms. The advantage of a Fourier 
specification or other flexible forms is its flexibility relative to alternative specifications, such 
as the Cobb–Douglas or translog cost function, and its robust foundation (see Gallant (1982)). 
However, the interpretation of a Fourier form or other flexible forms can be very complex. As 
far as we know, this comparison of different production technologies has never been applied 
before to waste collection cost functions. 
 
The estimates of different cost functions are given in Table 5. The overall conclusion is that 
the assumption of constant scale effects seems too restrictive.15 For the translog form, there is 
a U-shaped curve, but the minimum is small at 15,000 households (see also Figure 3, which 
shows the estimated relation for the different specifications between the cost per household 
and the number of households in a municipality; the markers show the available observations 
and the lines give points lying between observations). For almost all Dutch municipalities, 
costs will increase if the number of households increases. Interestingly, in the flexible 
functional form and the Fourier form, there are more turning points. The intuition behind the 
flexible functional form is that the analysis often takes place at a higher level than the 
                                                     
15 In this section, all estimates are without fixed municipality effects. If we include fixed effects, the scale 
patterns are less clear as the fixed effects will also capture parts of these different patterns.  
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underlying technological processes. If these processes have different scale effects, the analysis 
at total cost level should take account of this heterogeneity. Costs increase for larger 
municipalities, of around 200,000 households, and decrease for municipalities with around 
300,000 households, using the flexible functional form. It should be noted that the number of 
municipalities of this size is small and therefore we should be cautious with this 
interpretation. From Figure 3, it is clear that a Fourier cost equation can have more than one 
turning point, exhibiting something like a double M-shaped curve, for example. Interestingly, 
costs are low for municipalities of around 150,000 households, high for municipalities 
between 190,000 and 250,000, smaller again around 300,000 households, and larger again for 
bigger municipalities.  
 
Figure 3. Cost of waste collection per household and number of households  
 
 
 
As we have estimated the models in this section without fixed effects, the estimation in Table 
5 gives an unrealistic picture of the effects of unit-based pricing systems. Table 2 showed that 
if no fixed effects are taken into account, the effects of the frequency, bag and weight systems 
are much larger. Nevertheless, the estimations in this section are interesting as they show that 
the effect of dummies for the UBP system and for institutional form is independent of the cost 
function. Importantly, all our main conclusions of sections 3 and 4 with respect to unit-based 
pricing and institutional dummies are robust if another production technology, such as the 
Fourier specification, is used.  
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Table 5. Effect on waste collection costs: different production technologies  
Cobb–Douglas Translog Flexible Fourier 
Households 0.996*** 0.875*** 0.261 0.245 
0.5*Households2 0.013*** 0.077***
Households2  0.072*** 
Households3  –0.002*** 
Cos(households)  –0.136** 
Cos(2*households) –0.046***
Cos(3*households) –0.024***
Cos(4*households)  –0.015*** 
Sin(households)  –0.063*** 
Sin(2*households)  –0.038*** 
Sin(3*households) –0.026***
Sin(4*households)  –0.016*** 
Household size  –0.031 0.011 0.027 0.037 
Population density –0.013*** –0.014*** –0.014*** –0.014*** 
UBP volume –0.038*** –0.038*** –0.039*** –0.039*** 
UBP frequency –0.118*** –0.117*** –0.117*** –0.116***
UBP bag –0.231*** –0.230*** –0.229*** –0.231*** 
UBP weight –0.109*** –0.107*** –0.107*** –0.106*** 
Collection by neighbor 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 
Collection cooperation 0.010* 0.010* 0.012** 0.013** 
Collection MOF 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.030***
Collection private –0.029*** –0.028*** –0.027*** –0.027*** 
Constant 0.845*** 1.367*** 3.248*** 4.309*** 
     
R2 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.977 
Observations 6,655 6,655 6,655 6,655 
Clustered errors Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects municipalities No No No No 
Fixed effects years Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: ***/**/* indicates significance at 99%/95%/90%. MOF stands for municipality-owned firms. 
 
In Figures 4a–d, the confidence intervals of the scale effects for different production 
technologies are given. The solid black line represents the average estimated costs (with 
circles for the available observations and a line for points lying between observations), while 
the other lines represent the 95% confidence interval. It seems that scale effects are still 
present even when confidence intervals are taken into account. This conclusion is different 
from that of Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2008), where the confidence intervals are too wide to 
make rejection of a horizontal relationship between collection costs and number of 
households possible. However, that conclusion was based on a much smaller sample.  
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Figure 4. Confidence intervals of scale effects by different production technologies  
a. Cobb–Douglas 
 
 
b. Translog 
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c. Flexible 
 
 
d. Fourier 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
By using panel data for 1998–2012, we estimate the effect on waste collection costs of 
different institutional forms and unit-based pricing systems. We show that unit-based pricing 
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systems such as the weight-, bag- and frequency-based systems are more important from a 
cost-minimizing point of view than the institutional mode of waste collection. By dividing 
between price and quantity effects, we give an explanation for the increase in the number of 
municipalities with a frequency-based system, as the reductions in unsorted and compostable 
waste are sizeable and the administrative costs of such a system are small and an explanation 
for the small amount of the bag-based system is that it is not easy to price compostable waste. 
By using different production technologies such as a translog or a Fourier specification, we 
give some indication that Dutch municipalities already make use of scale effects. Only for 
very small municipalities are there some scale effects. Furthermore, the choice of production 
function does not influence the estimates for the different dummies.  
 
There are many avenues to explore in future research. First, it is important to collect more 
detailed information about the different unit-based pricing systems. The increasing number of 
municipalities with a frequency system is of special interest. In some municipalities, curbside 
collection of recyclables has expanded and households have to bring unsorted waste to pick-
up points. As it can be hard to collect cross-sectional data on these variables, case studies of 
different municipalities are a possibility as well. Also for municipalities with a bag system 
there can be interesting case studies as in some municipalities, such as Maastricht, the use of illegal 
lookalike bags is an issue (see also Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2014)). Second, it would be worthwhile 
to carry out a cost–benefit analysis of unit-based pricing methods or other recycling measures 
where externalities are taken into account. Third, one municipality’s decisions can be 
influenced by a neighboring municipality’s, and this can be tested using spatial models (see 
Brueckner (2003)). Fourth, it is important to study the interrelation between unit-based 
pricing systems and, for example, mandatory recycling as has been done by Yang and Innes 
(2007).  
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Appendix A. Definition of variables 
  
Costs (total) costs in euro per municipality 
Households number of households per municipality 
Household size  number of inhabitants per household 
Population density area in square meters per household 
UBP volume dummy is 1 if volume-based pricing system is 
present and 0 otherwise 
UBP frequency dummy is 1 if frequency-based pricing system 
is present and 0 otherwise 
UBP bag dummy is 1 if bag-based pricing system is 
present and 0 otherwise 
UBP weight dummy is 1 if weight-based pricing system is 
present and 0 otherwise 
UBP activism Dummy is 1 for all years if municipality 
introduces UBP in later years 
US number of separate collected waste streams 
Collection by neighbor dummy is 1 if waste is collected by 
neighboring municipality and 0 otherwise 
Collection cooperation dummy is 1 if waste is collected by 
cooperation of municipalities and 0 otherwise 
Collection municipality-owned 
firms 
dummy is 1 if waste is collected by 
municipality-owned firm and 0 otherwise 
Collection private dummy is 1 if waste is collected by private 
firm and 0 otherwise 
Waste total total quantity of collected waste (unsorted, 
biodegradable, glass, paper, textiles) in tonnes 
per municipality 
Waste unsorted total quantity of collected unsorted waste in 
tonnes per municipality 
Waste biodegradable total quantity of collected biodegradable waste 
in tonnes per municipality 
Waste paper, glass and textiles total quantity of collected paper, glass and 
textile waste in tonnes per municipality 
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Costs (euro/kg/inhabitant) costs in euro per kilogram per inhabitant 
(costs total divided by waste total) 
 
 
